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1Privacy Games along Location Traces:
A Game-Theoretic Framework for Optimizing Location Privacy
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CARMELA TRONCOSO, IMDEA Software, Spain
The mainstream approach to protecting the privacy of mobile users in location-based services (LBSs) is to
alter (e.g., perturb, hide, etc.) the users’ actual locations in order to reduce the exposed sensitive information.
In order to be effective, a location-privacy preserving mechanism must consider both the privacy and utility
requirements of each user, as well as their overall exposed locations (which contribute to the adversary’s
background knowledge).
In this paper, we propose a methodology that enables the design of optimal user-centric location obfus-
cation mechanisms respecting each individual user’s service quality requirements, while maximizing the
expected error that the optimal adversary incurs in reconstructing the user’s actual trace. A key advantage
of a user-centric mechanism is that it does not depend on third party proxies or anonymizers, and so it can
be directly integrated in the mobile devices that users use to access LBSs. Our methodology is based on the
mutual optimization of user/adversary objectives (maximizing location privacy vs. minimizing localization
error) formalized as a Stackelberg Bayesian game. This formalization makes our solution robust against
any location inference attack, i.e., the adversary cannot decrease the user’s privacy by designing a better
inference algorithm as long as the obfuscation mechanism is designed according to our privacy games.
We develop two linear programs that solve the location privacy game and output the optimal obfuscation
strategy and its corresponding optimal inference attack. These linear programs are used to design location
privacy-preserving mechanisms that consider the correlation between past, current and future locations of
the user, thus can be tuned to protect different privacy objectives along the user’s location trace. We illustrate
the efficacy of the optimal location privacy-preserving mechanisms obtained with our approach against real
location traces, showing their performance in protecting users’ different location privacy objectives.
CCS Concepts: rSecurity and privacy → Privacy-preserving protocols; Mobile and wireless security;
rInformation systems → Location based services; rNetworks → Network privacy and anonymity;
rMathematics of computing → Linear programming;
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1. INTRODUCTION
The widespread use of smart mobile devices with continuous connection to the Internet
has fostered the development of a variety of successful location-based services (LBSs).
Even though LBSs can be very useful, these benefits come at a cost for users’ privacy.
The whereabouts of users disclose aspects of their private lives that are not apparent
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at first, but can be inferred from the revealed location data [Freudiger et al. 2012; Golle
and Partridge 2009; Krumm 2007].
A large body of research has focused on developing location-privacy protection mech-
anisms (LPPMs) that allow users to make use of LBSs while limiting the amount of
disclosed sensitive information [Beresford and Stajano 2003; Chow and Golle 2009;
Freudiger et al. 2009; Gedik and Liu 2005; Hoh et al. 2007; Kalnis et al. 2007;
Meyerowitz and Roy Choudhury 2009]. These protection mechanisms are based on
increasing the uncertainty of the adversary about a user’s true whereabouts by hiding
locations from the LBS, or sending perturbed or fake locations. However, more often
than not the evaluation of these designs disregards that the adversary might have
some prior knowledge about users’ movements as well as about the algorithm imple-
mented by the LPPM. It has been shown [Shokri et al. 2011a] that such information
allows a strategic adversary to reduce her uncertainty on the user’s true location, and
hence prior evaluations overestimate the location privacy offered by a given protection
system.
Furthermore, previous work usually targets protection against localization at-
tacks [Shokri et al. 2011a; Shokri et al. 2011b], i.e., to protect the users’ whereabouts
when disclosing an obfuscated location to the LBS. Protecting the user’s current lo-
cation is intricately bound with protecting her past and future locations. Different
LBSs require the user location to be updated at different rates. Some require frequent
updates, such as applications for obtaining local traffic information – e.g., Beat the
Traffic, INRIX Traffic Maps, Routes & Alerts; or finding nearby points-of-interest, lo-
cal events, or nearby friends – e.g., Google Maps. Others can function perfectly well
with just a single location, such as Foursquare, Google Latitude / Google+ Local, or,
in general, location check-in and location-tagging services that require only sporadic
location exposures. The frequency of location exposures has a severe impact on the
privacy protection offered by an LPPM since locations exposed in quick succession are
highly correlated, leaking a lot of information that allows the adversary to reduce her
uncertainty on the user’s immediate past or future whereabouts.
In this work we propose an LPPM design methodology that explicitly accounts for a
strategic adversary, allowing for a more accurate estimation of the privacy protection
that can be achieved by these LPPMs. The design methodology takes location correla-
tion into account to effectively protect a user’s location privacy along her trajectory, e.g.,
it provides protection against inference attacks that aim at reconstructing the user’s
location in the past or predicting her location in the future based on what she shares
at any moment. We focus on user-centric LPPMs in which privacy decisions are made
locally by the user, rather than by a third party that acts as an anonymizer [Gruteser
and Grunwald 2003]. These LPPMs require no changes in the infrastructure nor any
cooperation from other users, from third parties, or from the LBS; hence, they can be
directly integrated into the mobile devices.
The goal of our methodology is to allow system designers to find the optimal
LPPM against a strategic adversary who, knowing each user’s LBS access pattern,
observation history, and the LPPM’s obfuscation algorithm, employs the theoretically
strongest attack to infer users’ whereabouts. The challenge is to design such an op-
timal protection mechanism when the inference attack, that the strategic adversary
will choose depending on the mechanism being designed, is a priori unknown to the
designer. To overcome this obstacle, instead of making assumptions about the adver-
sary’s inference algorithm (i.e., instead of assuming limits in his power), our approach
anticipates the optimal attack. Additionally, our methodology constrains the search
space to LPPMs that obfuscate locations in such a way that the quality of the LBS
response is not degraded below a threshold imposed by the user, hence guaranteeing
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the required service quality for the user. We assume that this user-specified service
quality constraint is also known to the adversary.
We formalize the problem of finding the optimal LPPM anticipating the optimal in-
ference attack as an instance of a zero-sum Bayesian Stackelberg game. In this game,
a leader and a follower interact strategically, with each one’s gain being the loss of
the other. The leader decides on her strategy knowing that it will be observed by the
follower, who will optimize his choice based on this observation. In our scenario the
user is the leader and the adversary is the follower. Then, the game precisely mod-
els that the adversary knows the user’s choice of protection mechanism and will use
that knowledge to improve his attack’s effectiveness. We further extend the classic for-
mulation of a Stackelberg game with an extra constraint to ensure that the service
quality is satisfactory for the user. This enables us to find the optimal point in the
tradeoff curve between privacy and service quality that satisfies users’ requirements.
We prove that the solution to our location privacy games can be obtained using linear
programs that must be solved by the user along the trace of her movements, since, as
she reveals more of her location over time, the adversary’s knowledge and observation
history evolves. Ours is, to the best of our knowledge, the first analytical framework
that allows us to integrate adversarial knowledge in the design methodology of optimal
user-centric privacy protection mechanisms.
We apply our methodology to design LPPMs for various scenarios in which we aim
at protecting not just the current user location, but also at protecting past locations
(i.e. the LPPM’s current obfuscation is chosen so as not to compromise the privacy
of past locations), future locations (i.e. the current obfuscation should be compatible
with potential future locations where the user might go next), and transitions between
locations (i.e. obfuscations of successive locations should be chosen jointly).
We evaluate the effectiveness of the designed LPPMs using real location traces,
showing that for a given user’s LBS access pattern and service-quality threshold, our
game-theoretic approach enables us to simultaneously find the optimal LPPM and the
optimal attack against it. We confirm that there is a trade-off between the maximum
achievable privacy and the service quality but, once a certain privacy level is reached,
loosening the quality requirements does not necessarily result in a privacy gain. We
also find that the location-privacy advantage of the optimal LPPM over a suboptimal
LPPM is larger when the quality requirement is tighter: The intuition is that, when
the quality requirement is loose, both LPPMs are allowed to add so much noise that the
attacker’s observation is very uninformative about the user’s true location. In contrast,
when the quality requirement is tight, the optimal LPPM makes a better allocation of
the limited noise it is allowed to inject.
In summary, our proposal for designing LPPMs showcases four contributions:
(1) Our LPPMs assume that the adversary is strategic, because, as Shannon’s maxim
states “One ought to design systems under the assumption that the enemy will
immediately gain full familiarity with them.”
(2) Our LPPMs are user-centric, needing no changes in the infrastructure, nor any
trusted third-parties, because we believe that would facilitate their deployment.
(3) Our LPPMs take into account that successively visited locations are correlated,
which dramatically changes the way they should be protected.
(4) Our LPPMs are optimal by design in the scenarios that they are designed for, hence
they offer the best possible privacy protection against the best possible attack.
We motivate and state the problem in the next two sections, and formalize the prob-
lem as a Bayesian Stackelberg game between user and adversary in Section 4. We
show how to design optimal protection mechanisms in different scenarios in Section 5,
and evaluate our method in Section 6. We discuss the related work in Section 7.
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2. MOTIVATION: LOCATION PRIVACY AGAINST STRATEGIC ADVERSARIES
This section delves into the need to consider, at the time of designing an LPPM, strate-
gic adversaries that use their knowledge of user behavior, LPPM operation, and cor-
relation between successively visited locations, since the use of such knowledge has
great impact on the maximum level of privacy achievable.
2.1. Strategic adversaries use prior knowledge on users’ behavior and LPPM design to
reduce their uncertainty
Consider a user who issues a location-based query from location (2,2), ⋆, in the area
depicted in Figure 1. Instead of revealing her true location, she uses an LPPM that out-
puts a 3x3 square, ⋆, centered on her true location. The hope is that this mechanism
masks her location, making any location within the exposed square equally probable
in the eyes of the attacker.
There are two problems with this naive approach. First, if the adversary has back-
ground information about the user’s mobility, the probability of the user being in any
location is not uniform anymore. For example, the adversary may have access to to-
pographic information about the area in which the user moves, which changes the
probability of the user visiting locations: The user is much more likely to be at the
shore of a lake than in its middle. This probability also changes if the attacker has
access to behavioral information about the user, e.g. her favorite locations reported in
social networks, or demographic information such as her age, which lead to likely lo-
cations of that particular demographic group. Second, if the adversary knows how the
mechanism works, the probability of the user being in any location may also change. In
the example above, such knowledge would completely break the user’s privacy. Upon
observing the reported square, the attacker would always correctly infer that the user
is located at (2,2), the center of the square.
These examples show that not considering a strategic adversary with access to back-
ground knowledge leads to an overestimation of the privacy achievable by an LPPM.
2.2. Strategic adversaries use correlation to reduce their uncertainty
1
1
2
2
3
3
4
4
5
5
⋆
⋆
⋆
⋆
⋆
⋆
⋆
⋆
⋆
Fig. 1. A user’s real location (⋆) and obfus-
cated exposed location (⋆). In principle, the at-
tacker has 1 chance in 9 to accurately locate the
user. However, if the attacker knows that row 1
is a lake, or that the protection mechanism al-
ways produces a 3x3 square centered on the real
location, then the user’s privacy is lower than
naively expected.
Users’ movements are not isolated discrete
events. Rather, users follow a trajectory to
go from one place to another. Along this
trajectory, users may query a location-based
service, continuously in time or only at se-
lected spots, to obtain useful information
concerning the surroundings or the arrival
point. However, even if not all points in
the trajectory are exposed to the service
provider, the correlation between consecutive
positions implies that inferring just one of
them reveals information about past and fu-
ture ones. For instance, spatio-temporal con-
straints derived frommaximum user velocity
may reveal with high probability the route
followed by a user between two successive lo-
cation exposures.
The correlation between successively
shared locations depends on two factors:
randomness of user mobility patterns and LBS access frequency. The former relates
to how predictable a user’s future location is given her current location. The latter
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defines the rate at which the LBS provider can sample the user’s trajectory. These two
factors have opposite effects on correlation: High randomness decreases correlation
between successively exposed locations, since the current position contains less
information about past and future events than when movements are deterministic. In
contrast, high LBS access frequency increases correlation: The user has little time to
move between two LBS accesses and exposed locations are nearer to each other than
when access frequency is low. We now show, through a toy example, how correlation
between successive locations can decrease the uncertainty of the adversary about past
and/or future locations of the user.
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(a) Time t−1: real location (2,2) (⋆);
exposed obfuscated location (2,2) (©).
As (2,2) was exposed, the user can
only be in the bottom left 3x3 square
(⋆). Since the user moves only to ad-
jacent locations, at time t she will be
in the bottom left 4x4 square.
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(b) Time t: real location (3,3) (⋆); ex-
posed obfuscated location (4,4) (©).
As (4,4) was exposed, the user can
only be in the top right 3x3 square
(⋆). However, the correlation with
the previous disclosure implies that
the user can only be in the dotted 2x2
square.
Fig. 2. Correlation of user’s locations between
time t − 1 and time t, reduces attacker’s uncer-
tainty about the user’s current (time t) location.
Consider the example in Figure 2 where
the LPPM outputs a location chosen arbitrar-
ily from the 3x3 square centered on (x, y),
{(x + i, y + j), i, j ∈ {−1, 0, 1}}, and where in
addition the user moves at most one location
per time unit. At time t − 1, shown in Fig-
ure 2(a), the user accesses the LBS from lo-
cation (2,2),⋆, and the LPPM reports obfus-
cated location (2,2),©. Given the reported lo-
cation and the LPPM mechanism, the adver-
sary can infer that the user could only have
been in the bottom-left 3x3 square of loca-
tions, ⋆. Moreover, since the user moves at
most one location per time unit, the adver-
sary knows that at time t she will be some-
where inside the bottom-left 4x4 square (as
shown by the arrows in Figure 2(a)).
At time t, shown in Figure 2(b), the user
accesses again the LBS from location (3,3),
⋆, reporting obfuscated location (4,4), ©.
Naively, as in Section 2.1, the probability of
the adversary correctly guessing her real lo-
cation is 1/9 (any location in the 3x3 square
surrounding location (4,4), ⋆). However, re-
call that the adversary knows from the ob-
servation at t − 1 that at time t the user can
only be in the bottom-left 4x4 square. Inter-
secting this knowledge with the current ob-
servation the adversary can deduce that the
user is in the darkened 2x2 square in Fig-
ure 2(b). Therefore, the probability of a cor-
rect guess is 1/4, more than twice as much
as the naively expected 1/9. This example
highlights that designing LPPMs disregard-
ing correlation may reduce the privacy of the
current location. We formally describe this
scenario as Problem 1 in Section 5, and we
also show how to optimally choose obfuscated
exposed locations to avoid this situation.
Now consider the example in Figure 3,
where at time t − 1 (Figure 3(a)) the user is at location (2,2), ⋆, but the LPPM re-
ports (1,1),©, instead of reporting (2,2); and at time t (Figure 3(b)) the user is at (3,3),
⋆, and the LPPM reports (4,4), ©. In this case, the correlation stemming from the
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user’s one-location-per-time-unit movement pattern compromises the real locations at
both t − 1 and t: The only two-step trajectory that is compatible with the successive
exposure of obfuscated locations (1,1) and (4,4) given the LPPM operation is that the
user accessed the LBS from (2,2) followed by (3,3). Strikingly, designing LPPMs disre-
garding correlation may retroactively compromise the privacy of past locations: the user
was safe until the obfuscated location at time t was reported. In Section 5, Problem 2,
we show how to choose obfuscated exposed locations at time t so as not to compromise
neither the previous nor the current location.
1
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5
⋆
⋆
⋆
⋆
(a) Time t−1: real location (2,2) (⋆);
exposed obfuscated location (1,1) (©).
Only from the bottom left 2x2 square
(⋆) can the user have produced ob-
fuscated location (1,1). Since the user
moves only to adjacent locations, at
time t she will be in the bottom left
3x3 square.
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(b) Time t: real location (3,3) (⋆); ex-
posed obfuscated location (4,4) (©).
Only from the top right 3x3 square
(⋆) can the user have produced ob-
fuscated location (4,4). However, the
attacker correlates the previous dis-
closure with the current one and con-
cludes that at t−1 the user could only
be at location (2,2), and at t she can
only be at (3,3).
Fig. 3. Correlation of user’s locations between
time t − 1 and time t, reduces attacker’s uncer-
tainty about both the user’s current (time t) lo-
cation and her past (time t− 1) location.
The example just discussed also illustrates
that the choice of obfuscated locations can af-
fect future privacy. Consider again the user’s
predicament at time t: She reported (1,1) at
time t − 1 and she is now at (3,3) trying
to choose an appropriate obfuscated location.
Revealing (4,4) is not an option since it would
reveal her real location at both t − 1 and t.
Hence, the unfortunate choice at t−1 reduces
her possible choices at t. In other words, fu-
ture privacy may be proactively compromised
by current choices. This scenario is handled
as Problem 3 in Section 5, where we offer a
mechanism to choose obfuscated exposed lo-
cations so as not to compromise future loca-
tions.
Finally, taking into account correlation be-
tween successively visited places is impor-
tant because transitions between locations
can also be sensitive, even when the indi-
vidual locations on their own might not be.
For instance, visiting the bank to make a big
withdrawal, and visiting a government offi-
cial in charge of land development licensing
may not be very sensitive if considered sep-
arately, but visiting the official immediately
after the bank may be much more sensitive.
Another sensitive issue with transitions be-
tween locations is that they reveal the di-
rection of travel. For instance, the adversary
may learn whether the user enters or exits a
building, e.g., a hospital.
The conclusion from these examples is
that it is important to take into account the
correlation between exposed locations when
designing LPPMs for frequently queried
location-based services, in order to protect all
past, current and future locations. In the fol-
lowing we introduce our mechanism that al-
lows to find the optimal way to expose ob-
fuscated locations, i.e., maximizing privacy
in the best possible way against a strategic
adversary.
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3. PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this section, we first explain our probabilistic framework and our assumptions about
the protection mechanisms and adversary model. We conclude by sketching the prob-
lem that we solve in this paper. In Table I, we summarize the notations introduced
throughout the section.
3.1. User and Adversary
We consider a scenario in which users move in an area partitioned into M discrete
regions R = {r1, r2, · · · , rM}. We also assume that time is discrete and it is partitioned
into different time periods (e.g., morning, afternoon). An event 〈r, t〉 denotes that the
user is at location r ∈ R at time t ∈ T . Slightly abusing notation, time-subscripted
variable rt will denote the user’s location at time t. Typical values from R are r, ri, rj ,
whereas typical time-subscripted locations are rt, rt−1, rt+1. As the user moves, she
connects to an LBS with which she shares her current location in order to obtain a
service.
The adversary is the LBS to which the user connects, or any entity that can eaves-
drop on the user-LBS communications. The adversary is passive and curious, and his
aim is to discover the location of the user at the query time. He observes the loca-
tions sent by the user (protected by the privacy mechanism, as described in the next
subsection), and also has some external information about the user’s mobility. For sim-
plicity we assume the user’s mobility is encoded as a Markov chain, although that is
not mandatory. Any other model is possible, as long as it allows us to compute proba-
bilities of the user visiting various (sequences of) locations.
Let ψt(r) be the probability, from the point of view of the adversary, that the user
accesses the LBS at time t from location r. So,
∑
r∈R ψt(r) = 1 for any time instant t.
We note that this quantity is time-dependent (i.e., users may have different access pat-
terns in the morning than in the afternoon). In addition, ψt(r) can depend on previous
LBS accesses that the user has made and the adversary has observed; this depen-
dence on previous accesses will be shown explicitly when needed. Overall, ψt can be
computed by the adversary from the combination of the user’s general mobility and
her previous LBS accesses. We call ψ the user’s profile as it reflects the behavior of the
user in accessing the LBS over time, as seen from the point of view of the attacker.
Note, crucially, that ψt(r) is the adversary’s prior information about the user’s loca-
tion at time t, before observing anything at time t.
3.2. Location-Privacy Protection Mechanism
As users want to preserve their location privacy when they use the LBS, they employ
a local and user-centric LPPM that transforms each true location r into a pseudolo-
cation (or obfuscated location) r′ ∈ R′, which is then sent to the LBS instead of the
actual location. For simplicity, we set R′ = R, though in the most general case, R′
is the powerset of R. Indeed, Problem 0 (Section 5) has been extended in this direc-
tion [Herrmann et al. 2013]. The corresponding events 〈r′, t〉 are termed pseudoevents
or observed events.
The transformation from r to r′ at time t happens probabilistically according to the
location obfuscation function implemented by the LPPM: a probability distribution
ft(r
′|r), which can be seen as a matrix whose rows are indexed by the locations r ∈ R
and whose columns are indexed by the pseudolocations r′ ∈ R′. For a given location r
the function ft(r
′|r) defines the probability with which the LPPM selects pseudoloca-
tion r′ as output.
ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article 1, Publication date: January 2015.
1:8 R. Shokri et al.
Table I. Summary of notations
Symbol Meaning
r, R, M Actual location of the user, set of possible locations, number of locations
ψt(r) User’s profile: the probability, according to the attacker, of the user being at
location r when accessing the LBS at time t.
〈r, t〉 or rt Actual event: the user is at location r at time t
r′, R′ User’s pseudolocation as the output of the LPPM, and the set of possible
pseudolocations
r′t observed pseudolocation r
′ of the user at time t
ft(r′| r) Location obfuscation function implemented by the LPPM: Probability of re-
placing r with r′ at time t
dq(r′, r) Incurred service-quality loss by the user if LPPM replaces location r with
pseudolocation r′
Qloss(ψt, ft, dq) Expected quality loss of an LPPM at time t, given profile ψt and the location
obfuscation function ft
Qmax
loss
Maximum tolerable service quality loss
rˆ Adversary’s estimate of the user’s location
ht(rˆ| r′) Adversary’s inference attack function: Probability of estimating rˆ as the
user’s actual location, if r′ is observed from the user at time t
dp(rˆ, r) Distance between locations rˆ and r: Privacy of the user at location r if ad-
versary’s estimate is rˆ
P rivacy(ψt, ft, ht, dp) Expected location privacy of the user at time t, given profile ψt using pro-
tection ft against attack ht
3.3. Service Quality Metric
In the aforementioned setting, the LBS response quality depends on the pseudoloca-
tion output by the LPPM and not on the user’s actual location. The distortion intro-
duced in the observed pseudolocations determines the quality of service that the user
experiences. We model the loss of service quality due to obfuscation using a distance
function dq(r
′, r).1 This function quantifies the dissimilarity between location r and
pseudolocation r′. Its value for any pair (r, r′) depends on how the LBS under consid-
eration responds to obfuscated locations, as studied e.g. in [Micinski et al. 2013], and
also on the user’s specific service-quality expectations. In many applications, the ser-
vice quality can be considered inversely proportional to the physical distance between
r and r′. For example, applications that find nearby points of interest could give very
different responses to r and to r′ even if they are only a couple of kilometers apart.
In contrast, there exist LBSs in which the service quality depends on other criteria,
such as whether r′ is within a region of interest. For a weather forecast application, for
instance, any pseudolocation r′ in the same city as the actual location r would result in
a high quality LBS response. In general, dq can model a broad range of service quality
loss functions, and it is considered as an input to our framework.
The expected quality loss Qloss due to an LPPM ft is computed as an average of
dq(r
′, r) over all r and r′:
Qloss(ψt, ft, dq) =
∑
r,r′
ψt(r) · ft(r
′|r) · dq(r
′, r). (1)
1The quality loss function could also be time dependent, e.g., users could be more concerned about quality
during working hours than during their free time.
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We assume that users impose a maximum tolerable service quality loss, Qmaxloss , so as
to prevent the obfuscation function frommaking the service useless for them. Formally,
Qloss(ψt, ft, dq) ≤ Q
max
loss . (2)
This constrains the LPPM obfuscation function ft(r
′|r), which must not output pseu-
dolocations that, on average, result in a lower quality. We note that the influence of the
threshold Qmaxloss on the LPPM depends on the function dq, hence it is also dependent
on the type of the LBS the user is querying. In the case of an LBS that finds nearby
points of interest, where dq is proportional to the physical distance between r and r
′,
enforcing the quality threshold could result in ensuring a maximum allowed distance
between these two locations. For the weather application, enforcing the quality thresh-
old could result in setting region boundaries within which locations lead to the same
forecast. For other location-based applications, the function dq and the threshold Q
max
loss
can be defined in the same vein.
3.4. Location Privacy Metric
The adversary’s goal is to infer the user’s true location rt after observing the LPPM’s
output r′t at time t. The adversary uses his knowledge of the user’s profile ψt to run
an inference attack on the observed location r′t in order to output estimations rˆt of the
user’s actual location. Formally, the attack result can be described as a probability dis-
tribution function ht(rˆt|r
′
t), which denotes the probability, according to the adversary,
that the user’s true location at time t is rˆt.
We follow the definition by Shokri et al. [2011b] and quantify the user’s location
privacy as the adversary’s expected error in his inference attack, i.e., the expected
distortion dp(rˆ, r) between the estimated location rˆ and the true location r. We compute
the expectation over all r, r′, and rˆ:
Privacy(ψt, ft, ht, dp) =
∑
rˆ,r′,r
ψt(r) · ft(r
′|r) · ht(rˆ|r
′) · dp(rˆ, r) (3)
The distortion function dp(.) quantifies the privacy that still persists despite the
inference attack. This level of privacy depends on the locations’ semantics and also
on the privacy requirements of the user (e.g., users might consider locations inside
a hospital more sensitive than other places), and dp(.) must be defined accordingly.
For instance, if the user wants to hide just her exact current location (as opposed to
hiding a large area around her location), the appropriate distortion function could be
the Discrete Metric between the estimated location rˆ and the actual location r:
dp(rˆ, r) =
{
0, if rˆ = r
1, otherwise
(4)
Substituting this dp(.) into (3) and performing the summation, we see that the term
with rˆ = r disappears, and all terms with rˆ 6= r survive with dp(rˆ, r) = 1. In other
words, the resulting sum is the total probability attributed to the wrong estimations
of r, i.e., the probability of error in the estimate.
Alternatively, the user’s privacy might depend on the physical distance between the
estimated and actual locations. In that case, the distortion function can be equal to the
Squared Euclidean distance between these locations:
dp(rˆ, r) = (rˆ − r)
2 (5)
In general, dp reflects the sensitivity of the user when r is estimated as rˆ. This
sensitivity can be due to any semantic relation between r and rˆ. We assume dp is an
input to our framework.
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3.5. Problem Statement
Having introduced all the components of our framework, we are ready to state pre-
cisely the problem that we solve. Given:
(a) a maximum tolerable service-quality loss Qmaxloss imposed by the user as a bound for
Qloss, computed using the quality function dq, and
(b) a user profile ψt, computed from the user’s mobility pattern and from her previ-
ously observed locations,
we find the LPPM obfuscation function ft that maximizes the user’s location privacy
as defined in (3). The solution must consider that the adversary
(a) observes the LPPM’s output r′, and
(b) is aware of the LPPM’s internal algorithm ft, and the user’s profile ψt.
The adversary implements the optimal attack ht that estimates the true location of
the user with the least distortion as measured by dp.
4. LOCATION PRIVACY GAMES
We formulate the problem of designing LPPMs that are optimal against the strongest
strategic adversary as a game. In fact, the problem of finding an LPPM that offers
optimal location privacy given the user’s profile, at a given time instant, is an instance
of a zero-sum Bayesian Stackelberg game. In a Stackelberg game the leader, in our
case the user, plays first by choosing an LPPM and committing to it by running it on
her actual location. The follower, in our case the adversary, plays next by estimating
the user’s location, knowing the LPPM that the user has committed to. It is a Bayesian
game because the adversary has incomplete information about the user’s true location,
and plays according to his hypothesis about this location. It is also an instance of a
zero-sum game, as the adversary’s gain (or loss) is exactly balanced by the loss (or
gain) of the user: the information gained (lost) by the adversary is the location privacy
lost (gained) by the user, according to the location privacy metric (3). We now proceed
to define the steps of the game adapted to our problem:
Step 0. At time t, Nature uses probability distribution ψt (reflecting the proba-
bilistic model for the mobility and the previously observed locations of the user) to
select a location r ∈ R for the user, from which the user accesses the LBS.
Step 1. Given the user’s location r, the LPPM uses ft(r
′|r) to select a pseudoloca-
tion r′ ∈ R′, subject to ft complying with the service quality constraint (2).
Step 2. Having observed r′, the adversary selects an estimated location
rˆ ∼ ht(rˆ|r
′), rˆ ∈ R. The adversary knows the LPPM’s probability distribution
ft(r
′|r); he also knows the user’s profile ψt, but of course not the true location r.
Final Step. The adversary pays an amount dp(rˆ, r) to the user. This amount repre-
sents the adversary’s error (equivalently, the location privacy of the user).
The above description is common knowledge to both the adversary and the user.
They both aim to maximize their payoff, i.e. the adversary tries to minimize the ex-
pected amount that he will pay, while the user tries to maximize it. Next, we describe
an optimization problem that formalizes the objectives of the user and of the adver-
sary. We construct two linear programs that, with inputs ψt, dp and dq, compute the
user’s optimal choice of protection mechanism ft as well as the adversary’s optimal
choice of inference attack ht. We emphasize that, when we use the terms “optimal ft”
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and “optimal ht” in this paper, we mean that they are optimal against each other, i.e.
they form a game-theoretic equilibrium. This is the kind of solution one looks for in a
game.
4.1. Optimal Strategy for the User
The adversary observes the pseudolocation r′ output by the LPPM, he knows the func-
tion ft(r
′|r) implemented by the LPPM, and he also knows the user’s profile ψt(.). Thus,
he can form the posterior distribution
Pr(r|r′) =
Pr(r, r′)
Pr(r′)
=
ft(r
′|r)ψt(r)∑
r ft(r
′|r)ψt(r)
(6)
on the true location r of the user, conditional on the observation r′. The adversary’s
objective is then to choose rˆ to minimize the user’s conditional expected privacy, where
the expectation is taken under Pr(r|r′). The user’s conditional expected privacy for an
arbitrary rˆ is ∑
r
Pr(r|r′)dp(rˆ, r), (7)
and for the minimizing rˆ it is
min
rˆ
∑
r
Pr(r|r′)dp(rˆ, r). (8)
If there are multiple values of rˆ that satisfy (8), then the adversary may randomize
arbitrarily among them, including selecting one of them with probability 1. The proba-
bility with which rˆ is chosen in this randomization is ht(rˆ|r
′). Of course, ht(rˆ|r
′) can be
nonzero only for minimizing values of rˆ; for all other values, ht(rˆ|r
′) will be zero. When
randomizing, (8) is rewritten as∑
r,rˆ
Pr(r|r′)ht(rˆ|r
′)dp(rˆ, r). (9)
Note that if there is only one value of rˆ satisfying (8), then this value is selected
with probability 1 in the randomization, whereas all other values are selected with
probability 0, so (9) reduces to (8). In this sense, (9) is a generalization of (8), but it
should be noted that both expressions compute the same conditional expected privacy.
We see that for a given r′, the user’s conditional privacy is given by (8). The prob-
ability that r′ is output by the LPPM is Pr(r′) =
∑
r ft(r
′|r)ψt(r). Hence, the user’s
unconditional expected privacy (averaged over all r′) is∑
r′
Pr(r′)min
rˆ
∑
r
Pr(r|r′)dp(rˆ, r) =
∑
r′
min
rˆ
∑
r
ψt(r)ft(r
′|r)dp(rˆ, r). (10)
To facilitate the computations, we define
xr′ , min
rˆ
∑
r
ψt(r)ft(r
′|r)dp(rˆ, r). (11)
Incorporating xr′ into (10), we rewrite the unconditional expected privacy as∑
r′
xr′ , (12)
which the user aims to maximize by choosing the optimal ft(r
′|r). The minimum oper-
ator makes the problem non-linear, which is undesirable, but (11) can be transformed
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to a series of linear constraints:
xr′ ≤
∑
r
ψt(r)ft(r
′|r)dp(rˆ, r), ∀rˆ. (13)
It turns out that maximizing (12) under (11) is equivalent to maximizing (12) under
(13) [Dasgupta et al. 2008, Ch. 7, p. 224].
We construct the linear program for the user from (12) and (13). Note that variable
xr′ is a decision variable in the linear program, i.e. it is among the quantities chosen by
the solver. This might appear counterintuitive, as xr′ is defined in (11) as a function of
ft(.), rather than as an independent variable that can be freely selected. But, because
of the transformation, it is always guaranteed that (11) will hold.
The linear program for the user is the following: Choose ft(r
′|r), xr′ , ∀r, r
′ in order to
Maximize
∑
r′
xr′ (14a)
subject to xr′ ≤
∑
r
ψt(r)ft(r
′|r)dp(rˆ, r), ∀rˆ, r
′ (14b)
∑
r
ψt(r)
∑
r′
ft(r
′|r)dq(r
′, r) ≤ Qmaxloss (14c)
∑
r′
ft(r
′|r) = 1, ∀r, and ft(r
′|r) ≥ 0, ∀r, r′. (14d)
Inequalities (14b) are the series of linear constraints (13), repeated for each value of
r′; inequality (14c) reflects the service quality constraint; constraints (14d) reflect that
ft(r
′|r) is a probability distribution function.
4.2. Optimal Strategy for the Adversary
To find the adversary strategy that is at a game theoretical equilibrium with the
user strategy computed in (14a-14d) (i.e., the two strategies are optimal against each
other), we construct and solve the linear program that is dual to (14a-14d): Choose
ht(rˆ|r
′), yr, ∀r, r
′, rˆ, and z ∈ [0,∞) to
Minimize
∑
r
ψt(r) yr + zQ
max
loss (15a)
subject to yr ≥
∑
rˆ
ht(rˆ|r
′)dp(rˆ, r)− zdq(r
′, r), ∀r, r′ (15b)
z ≥ 0 (15c)∑
rˆ
ht(rˆ|r
′) = 1, ∀r′, and ht(rˆ|r
′) ≥ 0, ∀r′, rˆ. (15d)
Note the role of variable z: In linear programming parlance, it is the shadow price
of the service quality constraint. Intuitively, z is the “exchange rate” between service
quality and privacy. Its value in the optimal solution indicates the amount of privacy
(in privacy units) that is lost (gained) if the service quality threshold Qmaxloss increases
(decreases) by one unit of quality.
For example, if z > 0 in the optimal solution, then any change ∆Qmaxloss in Q
max
loss will
change the privacy achieved by z∆Qmaxloss . In this case, constraint (14c) is satisfied as a
strict equality. In contrast, if constraint (14c) is satisfied as a strict inequality, then,
intuitively, the selection of ft(r
′|r) has not been constrained by Qmaxloss . In this case, any
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(small) changes in Qmaxloss will have no effect on ft(r
′|r), nor on the privacy achieved. So,
z would be zero.
Note that both linear programs compute the unconditional expected privacy of the
user (3), which we repeat here for convenience.
Privacy(ψt, ft, ht, dp) =
∑
rˆ,r′,r
ψt(r)ft(r
′|r)ht(rˆ|r
′)dp(rˆ, r). (16)
The optimal solution of each linear program results in the same value for the privacy
of the user. Hence, in principle, we only need to compute one of the two to quantify the
maximum level of privacy of the user. We choose to present both, because the user’s
linear program incorporates the service quality constraint in a more straightforward
manner, whereas the adversary’s linear program explicitly computes the “exchange
rate” between service quality and privacy.
5. LPPM DESIGN IN SPECIFIC SCENARIOS
We now formalize concrete problems, starting with sporadic location exposures and
continuing with the problems that were described in Section 2.2.
Compared to our description so far, the variations in the following problems have
to do with the previously observed pseudolocations (which affect the attacker’s prior
knowledge ψt() about his objective) and with the attacker’s objective (which may be not
just be to estimate the single current location rt, but also past locations rt−1 or future
locations rt+1, so this also affects the computation of ψt()). In other words, the central
quantity that changes among the various problems is the adversary’s prior knowledge
about his objective. For each particular problem, we show how to compute ψt(), which
can then be simply inserted into the linear programs (14) and (15). Finally, we show
how one can adapt the framework for arbitrary new problems.
Problem 0: Protecting privacy of time t at time t, with no previous exposure
The user has previously not exposed any pseudolocation. Currently, at time t, the user
issues her first query, and the LPPM must choose an appropriate obfuscation function
that generates r′t to protect the user’s current location rt.
This problem is equivalent to that of sporadic location privacy, which is relevant for
LBSs to which queries are sent sporadically: location check-in, location-tagging, or ap-
plications for finding nearby points-of-interest, local events, or nearby friends. In these
services, if there is enough time between queries, then successively exposed locations
are independent of each other, i.e. previous exposures do not give any information to
the attacker about the current exposure.
The relevant prior information in this case is Pr{rt} and it is computed from back-
ground knowledge about the area in which the user moves (e.g. if r is in the middle of
a lake, then presumably Pr{rt} = 0), and also from background knowledge about the
user’s mobility or habits (e.g. if the attacker knows the user’s daily mobility pattern,
then at t = 7am Pr{rt} is high for locations around the user’s home, and at 11am it is
high around the user’s workplace). If the mobility is described by a Markov chain, then
Pr{rt} can be simply read from the steady state distribution of the Markov chain.
Problem 1: Protecting privacy of time t at time t, for a given exposure at t− 1
At time t − 1, the LPPM exposed pseudolocation r′t−1. Currently, at time t, the user
issues another query, so the LPPMmust choose an appropriate obfuscation r′t to protect
the user’s current location rt. This is the problem shown in Figure 2 (Section 2.2).
The attacker, having observed r′t−1, has a probabilistic estimate of the user’s location
at time t−1, which was previously (at t−1) computed as ht−1(rˆt−1|r
′
t−1). This estimate
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must be “moved forward” to form a location estimate for time t. If we assume that
the user moves according to a Markov chain mobility model, “moving forward” from
t − 1 to t is equivalent to multiplying ht−1(rˆt−1|r
′
t−1) by the Markov chain transition
matrix Pr{rt|rt−1}. Note that the Markov chain assumption is not necessary for our
proposed approach; all we need is a way to compute a location estimate at time t from a
location estimate at time t−1. We make the Markov assumption for convenience; other
literature has used simpler models, based on just the velocity of the user [Ghinita et al.
2009].
Pr{rt|r
′
t−1} =
∑
rt−1
Pr{rt, rt−1|r
′
t−1} =
∑
rt−1
Pr{rt|rt−1}ht−1(rˆt−1|r
′
t−1) (17)
Function Pr{rt|r
′
t−1}, rt ∈ R is the prior information of the adversary for Problem 1.
The LPPM design continues with solving the linear program as in the previous section,
computing f(r′t|rt, r
′
t−1) for a particular value of r
′
t−1.
Note, however, that the prior information function Pr{rt|r
′
t−1}, and thus the designed
LPPM, is different for each value of the previously exposed r′t−1. This is a formal de-
scription of the obvious fact that the LPPM to be designed must depend on the exact
value of the previously exposed pseudolocation.
This dependence raises the practically important issue of when to compute the ap-
propriate LPPM. One choice is to precompute all LPPMs, one for each possible value
of r′t−1 (M in total), and then copy them to the device. This allows for performing all
computations on a powerful, non-resource-constrained machine, but it requires more
storage space on the mobile device. The other extreme is to compute the appropriate
LPPM when the actual r′t−1 becomes known, but this means that the computation has
to happen on the mobile device between time t − 1 and time t. So, there is a tradeoff
here, which we explore when discussing computational considerations (Section 6.2).
Of course there are intermediate solutions, such as precomputing and storing
LPPMs only for the most frequent pseudolocation values. The probability of each pseu-
dolocation can be computed as
Pr{r′} =
∑
r
Pr{r}Pr{r′|r} =
∑
r
Pr{r}f(r′|r). (18)
A variant of Problem 1 is when the latest exposure was at time t − k, for a single
value of k ≥ 1. Then we compute the prior by multiplying ht−k(rˆt−k|r
′
t−k) by the k-
th power of the Markov transition matrix. Note here that, if k is large enough, then
the effect of ht−k(rˆt−k|r
′
t−k) disappears, and so we are back to the original sporadic
problem of protecting privacy at time t with just Pr{rt} as the prior, as if there are no
prior exposures. We explore this variant next, where our general aim is to quantify the
effect of multiple past exposures, as opposed to just one.
Problem 1A: Exposing past pseudolocations and its effect on the adversary’s knowledge of
the user’s current location
In a continuous LBS, users expose more than one pseudolocation in short order. The
question is to what extent pseudolocations exposed before t − 1 give information to
the adversary about the user’s current (time t) location. If pseudolocations far into the
past need to be taken into account, then an LPPM that protects the current location
would be correspondingly more complex, as each possible combination of past expo-
sures would induce a different optimal current obfuscation; in other words, a different
LPPM would have to be computed for each combination.
ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article 1, Publication date: January 2015.
Privacy Games along Location Traces 1:15
To answer this question, we compare the sequence of priors Pr{rt}, Pr{rt|r
′
t−1},
Pr{rt|r
′
t−2}, · · · . The general term of this sequence, Pr{rt|r
′
t−k} is equal to
Pr{rt|r
′
t−k} =
∑
rt−k
Pr{rt, rt−k|r
′
t−k} =
∑
rt−k
Pr{rt|rt−k}ht−k(rt−k|r
′
t−k). (19)
The term Pr{rt|rt−k} is the k-step transition probability in a Markov chain mobility
model; it is computed as the k-th power of the corresponding transition matrix.
So we see that the effect of r′t−k on the adversary’s prior on the current location
comprises two factors: (1) the uncertainty for the true location rt−k at time t−k, which
is caused by the obfuscation used at time t− k, and (2) the dissipation effect caused by
the k-step transition from t− k to t.
Problem 2: Protecting privacy of times t− 1 and t at time t, for a given exposure at t− 1
At time t − 1, the LPPM exposed pseudolocation r′t−1. Currently, at time t, the user
issues another query, so the LPPM must choose an appropriate obfuscation r′t that
will protect the current location rt and will not retroactively compromise the user’s
previous location rt−1. In other words, the obfuscation r
′
t must be “compatible” with
the previously exposed r′t−1. This is the problem shown in Figure 3 (Section 2.2).
The prior information that is available to the adversary before he observes r′t is
Pr{rt, rt−1|r
′
t−1} = Pr{rt|rt−1, r
′
t−1}Pr{rt−1|r
′
t−1} = Pr{rt|rt−1}ht−1(rt−1|r
′
t−1). (20)
The first term Pr{rt|rt−1} is known from the mobility model (e.g. the Markov transition
matrix), and the second term ht−1(rt−1|r
′
t−1) is computed at t− 1.
Note that here the prior information is not just about the current location rt, but
rather about the pair (rt, rt−1), because that pair is the information that the adversary
tries to infer.
Problem 3: Protecting privacy of times t+ 1 and t at time t
In this Problem, we assume that there are no past exposures of the user’s location. The
user issues a query at the current time t, and her objective is to protect not only the
current location, but also the location at the next time instant t+ 1.
We discussed this scenario at the end of Section 2.2, and it is motivated as follows:
Disclosing the current location might not be important in and of itself, but it might
make it much easier for the adversary to infer the next location, which happens to be
very sensitive. For instance, the user might currently be on a street that only leads
to an abortion clinic. Hence, disclosing her current location is almost equivalent to
disclosing that she will go to the clinic. Symmetrically, her current location might be
very sensitive, and her next (expected) location can be linked easily to her current one.
For instance, she might be about to leave the abortion clinic and enter a street that is
only used as the clinic’s exit. Furthermore, neither the current nor the next location
might be particularly sensitive separately, but the transition from one to the other
might be.
The conclusion in all these cases is that the current location must be protected jointly
with the (possible) next one(s) where the user will be at time t+1. For this reason, the
LPPM should compute at the present time t the pseudolocations it is likely to output
at t + 1, so that the current choice of r′t does not limit future choices. The intuition is
that the LPPM should choose the current pseudolocation r′t so that future paths that
the user will likely take can be protected with pseudolocations compatible with r′t.
In this scenario, the prior information of the adversary is about the current (t) and
future (t+ 1) location of the adversary: Pr{rt+1, rt} = Pr{rt+1|rt}Pr{rt}. The first term
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is known from the Markov transition matrix, and the second term is, as in Problem 0,
just the steady state of the Markov chain.
As noted earlier, in all four problems we can compute an appropriate prior probabil-
ity distribution for the adversary’s knowledge about the target locations. This proba-
bility distribution is then used as a parameter in the linear program described in the
previous section. In Section 5.1 below, we see how one can write a linear program for a
very general set of target locations and prior exposures.
When problems are interleaved
As the user moves, she might be facing a different problem at each time, so she would
need to compute a succession of different LPPMs. For example, the first time she ex-
poses a location, Problem 0 applies. Then, at the next exposure, Problem 1 or Problem 2
could apply, depending on whether the user wishes to protect just the current location
(Problem 1) or both the current and the previously exposed location (Problem 2). The
prior probability at each time has to be computed taking into account the past LPPMs
and, most importantly, their corresponding attacks h: It is these attacks that deter-
mine the attacker’s probabilistic estimate of the user’s location at each time, which is
then multiplied by the transition probabilities to provide the prior probability for the
next time instant.
We now compute the prior probability at time t, t ≥ 2, in an example where the user
originally computed a Problem-0 LPPM at time t = 1, and then at every subsequent
time instant up to t − 1 she computed a Problem-2 LPPM. She is currently (time t)
interested in computing yet another Problem-2 LPPM, hence the prior probability is
Pr{rt, rt−1|r
′
t−1}. We denote by h
spor the Problem-0 attack.
The computation of the prior proceeds as follows:
Pr{rt, rt−1|r
′
t−1} = Pr{rt|rt−1, r
′
t−1}Pr{rt−1|r
′
t−1}. (21)
But the first term is known from the user’s mobility model: Pr{rt|rt−1, r
′
t−1} =
Pr{rt|rt−1}. If t = 2, the second term Pr{rt−1|r
′
t−1} can be immediately equated to
the attack h at time t − 1: Pr{rt−1|r
′
t−1} = h
spor
t−1(rt−1|r
′
t−1), as above. So this concludes
the case t = 2.
To compute Pr{rt−1|r
′
t−1} for the case t > 2, we use Bayes’ rule:
Pr{rt−1|r
′
t−1} =
Pr{r′t−1|rt−1}Pr{rt−1}∑
rt−1
Pr{r′t−1|rt−1}Pr{rt−1}
(22)
Now, Pr{rt−1} is known (again from the mobility model; if the mobility is a Markov
chain, then this is the steady state of the Markov chain), so we only need to compute
Pr{r′t−1|rt−1}:
Pr{r′t−1|rt−1} =
∑
r′
t−2
,rt−2
Pr{r′t−1, rt−2, r
′
t−2|rt−1}
=
∑
r′
t−2
,rt−2
Pr{r′t−1|rt−1, rt−2, r
′
t−2}Pr{rt−2, r
′
t−2|rt−1}
=
∑
r′
t−2
,rt−2
Pr{r′t−1|rt−1, rt−2, r
′
t−2}Pr{r
′
t−2|rt−2, rt−1}Pr{rt−2|rt−1} (23)
The first term is the LPPM function ft−1 as computed at time t−1 for Problem 2. The
third term is known from the mobility model. The second term Pr{r′t−2|rt−2, rt−1} is
equal to Pr{r′t−2|rt−2}, because the obfuscation at time t− 2 depends only on rt−2, rt−3,
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Fig. 4. A user moves from location (3, 4) at time t− 2, to (4,3) at t− 1, to (4, 2) at current time t. The user
wants to protect locations at times t − 1 and t, and these are denoted by atrg (target events). At past times
t− 2 and t− 1, the LPPM exposed pseudolocations (3, 3) and (3, 2) (denoted by opre), and to protect atrg the
LPPM currently exposes location (3, 1) (denoted by opost).
and r′t−3. Knowing rt−1 when rt−2 is already known gives us no extra information on
rt−3 or r
′
t−3. Hence, the computation of Pr{r
′
t−1|rt−1} is shown to be recursive:
Pr{r′t−1|rt−1} =
∑
r′
t−2
,rt−2
ft−1(r
′
t−1|rt−1, rt−2, r
′
t−2)Pr{r
′
t−2|rt−2}Pr{rt−2|rt−1}. (24)
Having recursively computed Pr{r′t−1|rt−1}, we substitute it into (22), the result of
which is in turn substituted into (21) to compute the desired prior.
5.1. Location privacy for a generic objective
As we see in the previous sections, many different variants of location privacy can be
formulated, depending on the adversary’s knowledge (i.e., past exposed pseudoloca-
tions), and on the privacy target (i.e., on what the user wishes to protect or, equiva-
lently, on what the adversary wishes to attack). Each combination leads to a different
optimal LPPM. In particular, in Problems 2 and 3, we see that the privacy target does
not need to be the user’s current location. It can be a pair or a tuple of locations, and
this tuple might not even include the user’s current location, e.g., if the user only wants
to protect a past location by choosing an appropriate pseudolocation at the current
time.
We now describe generic terminology and a generic linear program for LPPM design,
with the help of the example shown in Figure 4.
5.1.1. Generic LPPM parameters
— atrg denotes the target events that the user wants to protect, or equivalently, the
events that the adversary wants to infer. In the example, the user wants to protect
her location at times t− 1 and t and thus atrg = (rt−1, rt) = {〈(4, 3), t− 1〉, 〈(4, 2), t〉}.
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atrg f()
LPPM
h()
Attack
opost aˆtrg
P , opre f()
Fig. 5. Information available to the LPPM and the adversary: The LPPM wants to protect location(s) atrg
by producing appropriate pseudolocation(s) opost. The adversary observes the output opost of the LPPM and,
using his knowledge of the LPPM function f , estimates atrg; the adversary’s estimate is aˆtrg. The prior
knowledge of the adversary and of the LPPM consists of the transition matrix P and the pseudolocations
opre that have been produced in the past.
— opre is a subset of the pseudoevents that the LPPM created and sent to the LBS
up to but before the current time. These are the pseudoevents that matter for the
estimation of atrg: Typically, opre would be a sequence of consecutive pseudoevents
starting with a recent time instant (as old ones do not matter for estimating atrg)
and leading up to the current time. These are known both to the adversary and to
the LPPM. In the example, the relevant pseudolocations were exposed at times t− 1
and t− 2 and thus opre = (r
′
t−2, r
′
t−1) = {〈(3, 3), t− 2〉, 〈(3, 2), t− 1〉}.
— opost is the pseudolocation (or set of pseudolocations) that the LPPM produces to
protect atrg and that will be sent to the LBS at the current time. In the example, at
current time t the user exposes pseudolocation (3, 1) thus opost = (r
′
t) = {〈(3, 1), t〉}.
— f(opost|atrg, opre) is the probability that the LPPM produces opost, given its knowledge
opre and the locations atrg it is trying to protect. This function encodes the defensive
mechanism. It can be viewed as a codebook that prescribes, for each value of atrg and
opre, a randomization over the possible values of opost.
5.1.2. Generic privacy metric. As before, privacy is quantified as the adversary’s error in
estimating the user’s true location(s) atrg. Figure 5 illustrates the information flow of
events and pseudoevents to the LPPM and to the adversary. The detailed notation is
as follows:
— ψ(atrg|opre) is the adversary’s prior probability distribution on the inference target
atrg, given his prior knowledge opre. It encodes what the adversary can deduce about
atrg before observing the LPPM’s current output opost.
— aˆtrg denotes the adversary’s estimate of atrg. Similarly to atrg, it can be seen as a
time-indexed vector whose elements belong to the set R of locations.
— h(aˆtrg|opre, opost) is the probability that the adversary estimates aˆtrg to be the true
value of atrg, given his knowledge of prior pseudolocations opre and given the pseu-
dolocation(s) opost exposed at current time t.
— dp(aˆtrg, atrg) ≥ 0 is the privacy gain when the adversary’s estimate is aˆtrg and the
true value of the inference target is atrg. It is zero only if aˆtrg = atrg.
The privacy that an LPPM f(.) achieves against an adversary implementing attack
h(.) is then the expected value of dp(aˆtrg, atrg), given prior observations opre:
Privacy(ψ, f, h, dp; opre) = E{dp(aˆtrg, atrg)|opre} =
∑
atrg,aˆtrg
Pr{aˆtrg, atrg|opre}dp(aˆtrg, atrg)
=
∑
atrg
opost
aˆtrg
ψ(atrg|opre)f(opost|atrg, opre)h(aˆtrg|opre, opost)dp(aˆtrg, atrg).
(25)
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This formula represents the adversary’s expected estimation error.
5.1.3. Generic quality metric. The final ingredient is the quality metric:
— qtrg denotes the relevant events with respect to quality. Similarly to atrg, qtrg is a
time-indexed vector. However, its time indices are not necessarily the same as those
of atrg: The locations/times that matter for quality may be different from the ones
that matter for privacy.
— dq(qtrg, opost, opre) represents the quality loss when qtrg is the true value of the quality-
relevant events, the LPPM currently reports opost and it has reported opre in the past.
The expected quality loss caused by an LPPM f(.) is the expected value of
dq(qtrg, opost, opre) over all qtrg and opost, for a given history opre.
5.1.4. Generic linear program. We now form the linear program that computes the opti-
mal LPPM (using, as before, auxiliary variables xopost ):
We want to maximize
∑
opost
xopost under the constraint
xopost ≤
∑
atrg
ψ(atrg|opre)f(opost|atrg, opre)dp(aˆtrg, atrg), ∀aˆtrg, opost, (26)
under the quality constraint,∑
qtrg
opost
Pr{qtrg|opre}Pr{opost|qtrg, opre}dq(qtrg, opost, opre) ≤ Q
max
loss , (27)
as well as the constraint (omitted) that f should be a probability function.
6. EVALUATION
The LPPMs that we design are optimal by construction. In this section, we illus-
trate their privacy-utility performance, and we also compare them against non-optimal
LPPMs. We also show how the optimal attacks that we compute fare against non-
optimal, but intuitive, LPPMs. We begin with LPPMs and attacks computed for the
sporadic case (Problem 0), and we continue with trajectory-aware LPPMs.
6.1. Location Obfuscation for Sporadic Exposures
 
 
Fig. 6. Spatial histogram showing the density of
users per region (in log scale) in Lausanne. Size
is 15.32km×7.58km, divided into 20×15 regions.
We use real location traces of people (in Lau-
sanne, Switzerland) who use various means
of transportation.2 We select 11 users at ran-
dom, and we focus on their location traces
during the day (8am to 8pm), when it is more
probable that users use location-based ser-
vices. The length of the considered traces is
one month. The location area, within which
they move, is divided into 300 regions. Fig-
ure 6 shows the density of users across all
the regions. The grayness of the cells shows
the density of its corresponding region in log
scale. As many of the regions are abandoned
(or very rarely visited) by many individual
users, we compute each user’s profile ψ(.) by considering only the 30 most popular re-
gions across the whole population. This prevents sparse user profiles. A user’s profile
is the normalized number of her visits to each region.
2The traces are obtained from the Nokia Lausanne Data Collection Campaign dataset.
ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article 1, Publication date: January 2015.
1:20 R. Shokri et al.
Given distance functions dp(.) and dq(.) and service-quality loss threshold Q
max
loss , we
compute the optimal LPPM and its corresponding optimal attack by solving (14a) and
(15a) using Matlab’s linear programming solver. We then compare the obtained opti-
mal protection mechanism and the optimal inference attack against the basic obfusca-
tion LPPM and the Bayesian inference attack, respectively.
Basic Obfuscation LPPM. The basic obfuscation LPPM, with an obfuscation level
k = 1, 2, 3, . . ., is constructed in the following way: For each location r, we find its k − 1
closest locations (using the Squared Euclidean distance between the centers of the
regions). The LPPM function f(.|r) will be the uniform probability distribution on the
set of the k − 1 selected locations together with the location r. That is, location r is
replaced by each of the k locations, as a pseudolocation, with the same probability 1
k
,
and all other locations have probability 0. Thus, in practice, an actual location r is
hidden among its k − 1 nearest locations. We choose this mechanism, as it has been
very popular in the literature.
Given the user profile ψ(.) and quality distance function dq(.), we use (1) to compute
the expected service-quality loss Qloss(ψ, f, dq) for any LPPM obfuscation f(.), whether
it be optimal or not.
Bayesian Inference Attack on an LPPM. We compare the effectiveness of our
optimal attack with the Bayesian inference attack, which has been shown effective be-
fore [Shokri et al. 2011b]. The Bayesian attack first computes the posterior probability
of locations Pr(.|r′):
Pr(r|r′) =
Pr(r, r′)
Pr(r′)
=
f(r′|r)ψ(r)∑
r f(r
′|r)ψ(r)
, ∀r ∈ R. (28)
Then, it sets rˆ to the location that minimizes the expected estimation error rˆ =
argminrˆ
∑
r Pr(r|r
′)dp(rˆ, r). If the estimation error dp is the Squared Euclidean dis-
tance, then the attack selects the conditional expected value rˆ = E[r|r′] and the re-
sulting expected estimation error is the conditional variance Var[r|r′]. If dp is the Dis-
crete Metric, then the attack selects the location with the highest posterior probability
rˆ = argmaxrˆ Pr(rˆ|r
′) and the resulting expected estimation error is 1 −
∑
r 6=rˆ Pr(r|r
′).
These facts follow from standard Bayesian estimation theory.
The difference between the Bayesian attack and the optimal attack is that the
Bayesian attack does not take into account that the LPPM was designed to anticipate
the optimal attack against it, nor that the LPPM had a quality constraint. In contrast,
both of these facts are incorporated into the linear program that computes the optimal
attack. As a result, the Bayesian attack is not optimal against any particular LPPM,
definitely not against the optimal defense LPPM that our algorithms design.
Optimal Inference Attack on an Arbitrary LPPM. In order to make a fair com-
parison between the effectiveness of the optimal and obfuscation LPPM, we need to run
the same attack on both of them. The Bayesian inference attack described by (28) can
be performed against both. However, we still need to design an optimal attack against
arbitrary LPPMs that have not been constructed in our game-theoretic framework.
The optimal inference attack is the one that minimizes the expected user privacy:
h(.) = argmin
h
Privacy(ψ, f, h, dp). (29)
Given the user profile ψ(.), an LPPM f(.) and distortion function dp(.), the following
linear program finds the optimal attack h(.). Note that, compared to (15a), there is no
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User’s Profile
(1)
Optimal LPPM, over all locations
(2)
Obfuscation LPPM, over all locations
(3)
Optimal LPPM. Loc(13,7)
(4)
Obfuscation LPPM. Loc(13,7)
(5)
Fig. 7. Input/Output of LPPM. Profile of a user for whom the subsequent calculations are made (sub-
figure 1). Distribution Pr(r′) of observed pseudolocations when using the optimal LPPM with Qmax
loss
=
0.8690 (sub-figure 2). Distribution Pr(r′) of observed pseudolocations when using obfuscation LPPM with
Qloss(ψ, f, dq) = 0.8690 (sub-figure 3). Conditional distribution Pr(r
′|r) when using the optimal LPPM on
location r = (13, 7) (sub-figure 4). Conditional distribution Pr(r′|r) when using obfuscation LPPM on lo-
cation r = (13, 7) (sub-figure 5). Column 1 is the leftmost column, and row 1 is the bottom row. (Squared
Euclidean dp, Discrete Metric dq)
service quality constraint here, as the LPPM has been assumed to be arbitrary.
Minimize
∑
rˆ,r′,r
ψ(r)f(r′|r)h(rˆ|r′)dp(rˆ, r) (30a)
subject to
∑
rˆ
h(rˆ|r′) = 1, ∀r′, and h(rˆ|r′) ≥ 0, ∀rˆ, r′ (30b)
Tradeoff between Privacy and Service Quality. We now study the tradeoff be-
tween the level of privacy that the optimal LPPM provides, against the optimal attack,
and the service-quality loss that it causes. We plot in Figure 8(a) the evolution of the
service quality loss and the corresponding privacy achieved, as the optimal LPPM is
configured with higher and higher values of service quality thresholds Qmaxloss (for users
with diverse profiles). Each line in the figure represents one user and each ◦ represents
one Qmaxloss . We plot Privacy(ψ, f, h, dp) versus Qloss(ψ, f, dq).
Unsurprisingly, with higher levels of location-privacy protection comes a significant
degradation in service quality. Also, as expected, the maximum achievable location
privacy strongly depends on the user profile. This is reflected by the separation be-
tween the different lines. But we also see that each user’s privacy increases up to a
certain level and then there is no change even when the quality threshold Qmaxloss is
further increased. This is due to the presence of the optimal attack that squeezes the
location-privacy gain.
This effect is further illustrated in Figure 8(b), where the service-quality loss of the
optimal LPPM is plotted against the service-quality threshold. Once the optimal LPPM
offers the maximal location privacy for a given user profile, loosening the service-
quality constraint does not significantly change the LPPM’s underlying function f ,
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(a) Location privacy Privacy(ψ, f, h, dp) vs. Service-
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(b) Service-quality threshold Qmax
loss
vs. Service-
quality loss Qloss(ψ, f, dq), for a given level of loca-
tion privacy Privacy(ψ, f, h, dp). The circles ◦ repre-
sent different values of Privacy(ψ, f, h, dp).
Fig. 8. Tradeoff between Privacy and Service Quality: Optimal LPPM against the optimal attack. The
different lines represent users with diverse profiles ψ(.). (Squared Euclidean dq(.) and Squared Euclidean
dp(.).)
and thus there is no reduction in service quality. In other words, there is no need to
sacrifice any more service quality, even though the looser Qmaxloss constraint allows it,
because doing so does not increase the user’s location privacy.
We can draw some parallels with the “shadow price” interpretation of z in the linear
program (Section 4.2): In that section, we see that z = 0 means that small changes to
Qmaxloss have no effect on privacy, whereas a positive value of z gives the rate of privacy
increase for a small change in Qmaxloss . Qualitatively, we observe both these effects in
the figure (an initial privacy increase with Qmaxloss , subsequently no effect on privacy as
Qmaxloss increases further). However, note that the “shadow price” interpretation is only
valid for small changes of Qmaxloss , so, strictly speaking, we cannot quantitatively link the
values of z to the observed privacy changes in the figure.
Optimal LPPM and attack are better than Basic LPPM and Bayesian attack.
Given Squared Euclidean distance functions dp(.) and dq(.), we compute the optimal
LPPM and attack methods for a set of service quality thresholds Qmaxloss . For each user,
we run the Bayesian inference attack on her optimal LPPM. We also evaluate the
location privacy offered by the basic obfuscation LPPM with respect to the optimal
attack. We vary the obfuscation level from 1 (minimum) to 30 (maximum), and for
each level we compute the corresponding quality loss. Then, this value is set as the
threshold Qmaxloss in the computation of the optimal attack mechanism.
Figure 9(a) shows the superiority of the optimal attack to the Bayesian attack, when
location privacy of users is protected using the optimal LPPM: For any given user and
service-quality threshold, the location privacy that the user obtains is smaller when
the adversary implements the optimal strategy rather than the Bayesian attack.
Figure 9(b) shows the superiority of the optimal LPPM to the obfuscation LPPM,
against the optimal attack: For any given user and service-quality threshold, a user
has a higher privacy level when the LPPM implements the optimal strategy. Note that
the privacy levels achieved by the two mechanisms approach each other and eventually
become equal when very little service quality is guaranteed for the user (i.e., when
Qmaxloss is set to its maximum value). When the quality requirement becomes looser and
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(a) Location privacy Privacy(ψ, f, h, dp) offered by
the optimal LPPM against the optimal attack de-
rived using the game theoretic approach vs. against
the Bayesian-inference attack.
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(b) Location privacy Privacy(ψ, f, h, dp) offered by
the optimal LPPM vs. location privacy offered by the
basic obfuscation LPPM, both evaluated against the
optimal attack.
Fig. 9. Effectiveness of the optimal attack and optimal LPPM strategies. Lines represent users with dif-
ferent profiles ψ(.). Circles ◦ represent different values of Qmax
loss
, each of which corresponds to a different
obfuscation level of the basic obfuscation LPPM. (Squared Euclidean dq(.) and Squared Euclidean dp(.).)
looser, both mechanisms add so much noise that the adversary in effect learns nothing
new about the user’s true location.
6.2. Location Obfuscation over a Trajectory
So far, we analyzed the behavior of optimal LPPMs in the sporadic setting. In this
section, we focus on LPPMs that take the previous exposed locations into account. We
also evaluate transition privacy.
For the comparison to the sporadic LPPM and for the illustration of the privacy-
quality tradeoff, we use a real data set of location traces. These traces, which are one
day long, belong to 10 randomly chosen mobile users (vehicles) in the San Francisco
Bay area from the epfl/mobility dataset at CRAWDAD. We divide the Bay Area into
10 × 25 equal-size locations, and consider a day to be composed by 288 time units, one
per each 5 minutes. We emphasize that the granularity of both time and locations can
be arbitrarily selected depending on the required accuracy in quantifying privacy and
service quality. We consider all the locations that are visited by each user, which on
average is 23.4 locations per user. We also consider all the transitions that each user
has made between these locations in our dataset.
Without loss of generality, we select the privacy gain dp and the quality loss dq
functions to be the Discrete Metric: dp(aˆtrg, atrg) = 1aˆtrg 6=atrg and dq(qtrg, opost, opre) =
1qtrg 6=(opost,opre). Taking the privacy gain as an example, using the Discrete Metric im-
plies that we only consider it bad for privacy when the attacker correctly estimates the
exact value of the target locations (i.e., when aˆtrg is exactly equal to atrg). All other es-
timates are equally good for privacy, regardless, e.g., of the physical distance between
the attacker’s estimate and the true value of atrg. As our quantification of privacy is
the expected value of dp(aˆtrg, atrg) – and the expected value of 1aˆtrg 6=atrg is just the
probability of aˆtrg 6= atrg, which is the adversary’s probability of error.
For the maximum tolerable quality loss Qmaxloss , we do not specify a single value, but
rather compute the achievable privacy for multiple values, so as to observe the privacy-
quality tradeoff.
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For the previously reported events opre, we do not specify a single value. Instead, the
privacy values that we compute are averaged over all possible values of opre, because
such an average is more representative of the privacy that a user can expect to achieve:∑
opre
Pr{opre}Privacy(ψ, f, h, dp; opre).
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Fig. 10. Users’ single-location privacy, using a spo-
radic LPPM against two attacks: sporadic attack
vs. correlation-aware attack. For 10 different users
(lines), and for various values of the service quality
thresholdQmax
loss
(dots), we see that the privacy against
a correlation-aware attack (x-axis) is always less than
the privacy against a sporadic attack (y-axis).
Comparison to Optimal Sporadic
LPPM. A trajectory-oblivious (sporadic)
LPPM is typically evaluated against an
attack that is also sporadic, i.e., an at-
tack in which location correlation is not
taken into account. To provide quanti-
tative justification for the inadequacy of
such LPPMs and their evaluation when
the exposed locations are correlated, we
show in Figure 10 that a correlation-
aware attack can achieve much lower
privacy than a sporadic attack.
A sporadic LPPM protects single loca-
tions only, so to compare meaningfully,
we pick as objective of the correlation-
aware attack the single-location privacy
objective, i.e., atrg = rt. The differ-
ence between the correlation-aware at-
tack and the sporadic attack is that the
former uses the conditional prior proba-
bility on the target location ψ(rt|opre) (for
opre = ot−1), whereas the latter uses the unconditional prior ψ(rt).
Each attack is paired against the same sporadic LPPM, and the results are plot-
ted across the 10 mobile users and for various values of the service quality threshold
Qmaxloss . As all data points are below the x = y diagonal, we conclude that privacy in the
correlation-aware attack (x-axis) is lower than privacy in the sporadic attack (y-axis).
The only cases where the two attacks are equally (un-)successful are when the quality
loss threshold is so high that the sporadic LPPM can inject enough noise to blur even
the inference of a correlation-aware attack.
Privacy-Quality Tradeoff. Here, we illustrate the privacy-quality tradeoff of our
LPPMs for two particular scenarios: Protecting single-location privacy for the current
location, taking into account the immediately previous pseudolocation (atrg = rt and
opre = ot−1), shown in Figure 11(a); and protecting transition privacy for the current
and future locations (atrg = (rt, rt+1)), shown in Figure 11(b).
Under each of these two scenarios, we construct the optimal protection mechanism
for each of the 10 users in our traces (i.e., the mechanism that provides the maximum
privacy for her). We plot this maximum privacy as a function of the service quality
threshold Qmaxloss . We see in both figures that the achievable privacy increases as Q
max
loss
increases (as higher values of Qmaxloss let the LPPM inject more noise).
Similarly to the sporadic case, we observe two effects: First, a saturation effect takes
place for most users as Qmaxloss increases. Their privacy reaches a plateau beyond which
any further increase in Qmaxloss does not increase privacy. Second, the privacy plateau,
as well as the privacy level for any value of Qmaxloss , differs for each user, indicating that
there is an inherent per-user privacy limit that is connected to how predictable the
user’s mobility is.
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(a) Single-location privacy: Protecting the current lo-
cation (atrg = rt), when opre is the pseudolocation
reported in the previous time instant ot−1.
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(b) Transition privacy: Protecting the current and
the next location (atrg = (rt, rt+1)).
Fig. 11. Tradeoff between Privacy and Service Quality. Each curve corresponds to one user.
Computational Considerations. Our mechanism is intended to be computed of-
fline and used online: The LPPM function f(opost|atrg, opre) is precomputed offline and
then downloaded to the device. Then, whenever the user attempts to expose a loca-
tion, the LPPM looks up and performs the appropriate randomization on pseudoloca-
tions opost, based on the actual values of the target events to be protected atrg and the
previously exposed vector of pseudolocations opre. In this way, the only computational
burden of the mobile device is a look-up and a randomized selection of opost.
The offline computation of the LPPM function f requires solving a separate linear
program for each value of opre that may arise in practice. But most of the theoretically
possible values of the vector opre are nonsensical sequences of locations, e.g., sequences
where successive locations are too far away from each other, so these need not be taken
into account, which saves considerable time. Similarly, the number of variables in each
linear program is theoretically equal to the total number of pairs of atrg and opost vec-
tors, since a value for f must be computed for each such combination. This number is
M length(atrg)+length(opost) (recall that M is the total number of locations), but in practice
it is much smaller. The actual number of linear programs and of variables is closer to
the number of likely trajectories of the corresponding length (the number of linear pro-
grams is equal to the number of trajectories of length length(opre), whereas the number
of variables is equal to the number of trajectories of length length(atrg)+ length(opost)).
It is very important to notice also that the computation of f needs to be done only
once, so the associated cost only needs to be incurred once. A recomputation of f is only
necessary if, for example, the user parameters or application parameters dp, dq, Q
max
loss
change, or if the user wants to protect a different aspect of her privacy (e.g., previ-
ous, present, and next location, instead of just present and next location), which would
translate to a change in atrg, or if one wishes to take into account different prior knowl-
edge of previously reported pseudolocations opre (e.g., take into account the 3 previously
reported pseudolocations instead of just one).
7. RELATED WORK
Location privacy has been a very active area of research in recent years. Work on this
topic can be roughly classified in three categories: mainly focused on the design of
LPPMs; mainly focused on recovering actual user trajectories from anonymized or per-
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turbed traces; or mainly focused on the formal analysis and the search for appropriate
location privacy metrics to allow for fair comparison between LPPMs.
Existing LPPMs are built according to different design principles. The most popular
approach to obtaining location privacy is to send a space- or time-obfuscated version of
the users’ actual locations to the service provider [Gedik and Liu 2005; Gruteser and
Grunwald 2003; Hoh et al. 2007; Kalnis et al. 2007]. A different approach consists in
hiding some of the users’ locations by using mix zones [Beresford and Stajano 2003;
Freudiger et al. 2009], or silent periods [Jiang et al. 2007]. These are regions where
users do not communicate with the provider while changing their pseudonym. Pro-
vided that several users traverse the zone simultaneously, this mechanism prevents
an adversary from tracking them, as he cannot link those who enter with those who
exit the region. A third line of work protects location privacy by adding dummy re-
quests, indistinguishable from real requests, issued from fake locations to the service
provider [Chow and Golle 2009]. The purpose of these fake locations is to increase the
uncertainty of the adversary about the users’ real movements.
The predictability of users’ location traces, and the particular constraints of users’
movements, has been shown to be sufficient to reconstruct and/or identify anonymous
or perturbed locations. An adversary can, to name but a few possibilities, infer users’
activities from the frequency of their visits to certain locations [Liao et al. 2007];
re-identify anonymous low-granularity location traces given the users’ mobility pro-
files [De Mulder et al. 2008]; or derive [Hoh et al. 2006], and re-identify [Golle and
Partridge 2009; Krumm 2007] the home address of individuals from location traces.
Several authors have made efforts towards formalizing the desirable location privacy
requirements that LPPMs should fulfill, as well as towards finding suitable metrics to
evaluate the degree to which these requirements are fulfilled. Examples of these lines
of work are Krumm [2007], Decker [2009], and Duckham [2010]. Shokri et al. [2009]
revisit existing LPPMs and the location-privacy metrics used in their evaluation. They
classify these metrics in three categories: uncertainty-based (entropy), error-based and
k-anonymity. The authors conclude, by means of a qualitative evaluation, that metrics
such as entropy and k-anonymity are not suitable for measuring location privacy. In
a follow-up of this work, Shokri et al. [2011a; 2011b] provide a framework to quantify
location privacy. The framework allows us to specify an LPPM and then to evaluate
various questions about the location information leaked. Our design methodology uses
this analytical framework as an evaluation tool to quantifying the LPPMs’ offered
privacy against the localization attack.
Specifically for protecting trajectory privacy (i.e. consecutive location exposures), a
first class of mechanisms in the literature protect user privacy when trajectories are
published in bulk. Protection is achieved by grouping trajectories of different users
in a wide area to ensure that the aggregate trajectory can be ascribed to at least
k users [Abul et al. 2008]; mixing the trajectories of k users [Nergiz et al. 2009];
eliminating some events from the published dataset [Hoh et al. 2010; Terrovitis and
Mamoulis 2008]; or replacing locations with larger regions defined by a pre-defined
grid [Gido´falvi et al. 2007]. Along similar lines, some protection algorithms need ac-
cess to the complete trajectory before protection can be applied [You et al. 2007], or they
delay the exposure of queries so as to gather additional information about subsequent
user locations [Ghinita et al. 2009; Ardagna et al. 2012]. In contrast, our approach
decides in real time how to protect a given location that the user is about to expose.
Other trajectory-aware mechanisms assume the existence of a trusted third party
(e.g. the cellular service provider) [Pan et al. 2009; Gao et al. 2013], or assume
that nearby users are present and can be leveraged to achieve joint privacy protec-
tion [Beresford and Stajano 2003; Freudiger et al. 2009; Huang et al. 2006]. Both of
these scenarios violate the user-centricity design requirement in this paper. Not de-
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pending on other users is also the reason why k-anonymity does not apply in our case,
as well as any other method that attempts to make users indistinguishable.
Despite the extent to which location privacy has been studied, there is a patent dis-
connection between these different lines of work. Most of the aforementioned papers
use different models to state the problem and evaluate location privacy. This hinders
the comparison of systems and slows down the design of robust LPPMs. Further, in
some of these papers there is a detachment between the proposed design and the ad-
versarial model against which it is evaluated. Often the considered adversary is static
in its knowledge and disregards the information leaked by the LPPM algorithm; or ad-
versarial knowledge is not even considered in the evaluation. The works by Freudiger
et al. [2009] and Shokri et al. [2009; 2011a; 2011b] do consider a strategic adversary
that exploits the information leaked by the LPPM in order to compute location pri-
vacy. Nevertheless, their work does not address how this privacy computation can be
integrated in the design of location-privacy preserving mechanisms.
In this work, we bridge the gap between design and evaluation of LPPMs. We pro-
vide a systematic method for developing LPPMs; our method maximizes users’ location
privacy while guaranteeing a desired level of service quality. We formalize the optimal
design problem as a Bayesian Stackelberg game similar to previous work on security
in which, as in our location-privacy scenario, the defender can be modeled as a Stack-
elberg game leader, and the adversary as the follower. The common theme with this
previous work is that the defender must commit to a defense strategy/protocol, which
is then disclosed to the adversary, who can then choose an optimal course of action after
observing the defender’s strategy. Paruchuri et al. [2008] propose an efficient algorithm
for finding the leader’s optimal strategy considering as a main case study a patrolling
agent who searches for a robber in a limited area. In their case, the defender is un-
sure about the type of the adversary (i.e. where the adversary will attack). In contrast,
in our work it is the adversary who is unsure about the type (i.e. the true location)
of the user/defender. A similar approach is used by Liu and Chawla [2009] in the de-
sign of an optimal e-mail spam filter, taking into account that spammers adapt their
e-mails to get past the spam detectors. The same problem is tackled by Bru¨ckner and
Scheffer [2011], who further compare the Stackelberg-based approach with previous
spam filters based on support vector machines, logistic regression, and Nash-logistic
regression. Korzhyk et al. [2011] contrast the Stackelberg framework with the more
traditional Nash framework, within a class of security games. A recent survey [Man-
shaei et al. 2013] explores the connections between security and game theory more
generally. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first that uses Bayesian Stack-
elberg games to design optimal privacy-protection mechanisms.
The only other formal approach to measuring and protecting privacy that we are
aware of is by Andre´s et al. [2013], who extend the concept of differential privacy to
sporadic location privacy, thus defining a new privacy metric: geo-indistinguishability.
They also propose a mechanism to achieve it optimally [Bordenabe et al. 2014]. In
later work [Chatzikokolakis et al. 2014], geo-indistinguishability is extended to cor-
related location traces. To achieve this extended notion of geo-indistinguishability,
the concrete mechanism proposed reports the previous pseudolocation (i.e. r′t = r
′
t−1)
if that is acceptable in terms of quality (i.e. if r′t−1 is close enough to rt), or adds
zero-mean Laplacian noise to the true location rt otherwise. The main feature of geo-
indistinguishability in both the sporadic and in the correlated setting is that it does
not use any information about the adversary’s prior knowledge, whereas our approach
does. We consider this to be a design choice for the LPPM designer, rather than an ob-
jective advantage or disadvantage of one method over the other, as it in effect models a
different adversary. If the LPPM designer wants to protect against an adversary with
some background knowledge, then our approach is the only one possible. Otherwise,
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one can use either our approach with an uninformative prior (i.e. with a uniform prior
over all possible locations), or the no-prior approach. The technical difference between
the two is that our approach aims to maximize the Bayesian estimation error, whereas
no-prior approaches aim to keep the likelihoods of nearby locations close to each other.
In a recent work, Shokri [2015] shows how to combine the two notions of differential
and distortion privacy, and how to optimize their joint effect on privacy and utility.
However, it does not address trajectories and correlated locations.
8. CONCLUSION
Accessing location-based services from mobile devices entails a privacy risk for users,
since sensitive information can be inferred from the locations they visit. This infor-
mation leakage raises the need for robust location-privacy protecting mechanisms
(LPPMs). In this paper, we have proposed a game-theoretic framework that enables
a designer to find the optimal LPPM for a given location-based service, ensuring a sat-
isfactory service quality for the user. This LPPM is designed to provide user-centric
location privacy, hence it is ideal to be implemented in mobile devices.
Our method accounts for the fact that the strongest adversary not only observes the
perturbed location sent by the user but also knows the algorithm implemented by the
protection mechanism. Hence, he can exploit the information leaked by the LPPM’s al-
gorithm to reduce his uncertainty about the user’s true location. In our approach, the
user is aware of the adversary’s knowledge and does not make any assumption about
attacker’s computation power. Hence, she prepares the protection mechanism against
the strongest possible attack by modeling the problem as a Bayesian Stackelberg com-
petition.
We have validated our method using real location traces. We have demonstrated
that our approach finds the optimal attack for a given LPPM and service-quality con-
straint, and we have shown that it is superior to other LPPMs such as basic location
obfuscation. We have also shown that the superiority of the optimal LPPM over alter-
natives is more significant when the service-quality constraint imposed by the user is
tightened. Hence, our solution is effective exactly where it will be used. Finally, our re-
sults confirm that loosening the service-quality constraint allows for increased privacy
protection, but the magnitude of this increase strongly depends on the user profile,
i.e., on the degree to which a user’s location is predictable from her LBS access profile.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first framework to explicitly include the ad-
versarial knowledge into a privacy-preserving design process, considering the common
knowledge between the privacy protector and the attacker.
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